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Recommendations for Strengthening Proposed Safeguards in the
Leaked TPP Investment Chapter
The leaked text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) Agreement’s investment chapter reveals that 
negotiators are giving serious consideration to a 
safeguard intended to allow nations to regulate 
capital flows.2  It is critical that the safeguard be 
drafted in such a way that governments have 
sufficient policy flexibility to prevent and mitigate 
financial instability.
Since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a growing 
array of economists have come to recognize that 
measures to regulate the inflow and outflow of 
short-term capital flows are legitimate policy tools 
for preventing and mitigating financial instability. 
Despite this emergent consensus, the leaked TPP 
investment chapter replicates the standard “free 
transfers” obligations of past U.S. pacts, which deny 
governments the ability to regulate capital flows. 
However, an annex to the chapter includes two 
safeguard proposals—the original proposal (Annex 
CCC.3) and an ”alternative working compromise 
text” (referred to here as the CCC.3 alternative).  
Including a safeguard would be a significant 
improvement over most past U.S. trade agreements 
and bilateral investment treaties.  Since 1994, 
no United States trade pact has included such a 
safeguard provision.  
But the details matter. And while the original 
proposal in the leaked text is far stronger than 
the alternative, both have limitations and neither 
would sufficiently safeguard a range of appropriate 
measures enacted to prevent or mitigate financial 
instability. 
Rather than trying to water down the original 
proposal, TPP negotiators should work to improve 
upon it. This short policy brief outlines some of the 
shortcomings in both safeguard proposals under 
negotiation and offers an alternative proposal.  
Kevin P. Gallagher, Annamaria Viterbo, Sarah Anderson1
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host state to a narrow “necessity test”.  The host 
state would need to prove that the measures taken 
did “not exceed those necessary” to deal with the 
problem at hand. Proving the “necessity” of a public 
policy has been a fraught effort in international 
trade cases. For example, the primary reason that 
governments have repeatedly failed to use the GATS/
GATT “general exception” to defend challenged 
policies is that WTO tribunals have consistently 
deemed the policies as failing to meet the high 
threshold of the general exception’s necessity test.5
•   May not give nations ample time to regulate; 
might conflict with IMF recommendations.   
Under 3 (e) the CCC.3 notes that measures shall 
be “temporary and be phased out.”  As stressed 
in the economic literature and in numerous IMF 
documents, it is prudent for regulations on the 
inflow and outflow to be temporary, but some 
capital inflow surges and capital outflow crises last 
longer than others. 
 
 
2.  Limits of CCC.3 alternative
The “alternative” text includes the areas of 
concern listed above and also introduces five 
other limitations that would render the safeguard to 
be of little use in preventing or mitigating financial 
crises. 
•   Exempts equities from regulation.   
By far the most concerning of all the measures 
in the alternative text is paragraph 3. “Measures 
referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transfers 
associated with equity investments.”  The leaked text 
defines “equity” as “shares, stock and other forms of 
equity participation in an enterprise”, in contrast to 
an enterprise itself, and most importantly, “bonds, 
debentures, other debt instruments and loans”, as 
well as “futures, options and derivatives”.  When 
capital flows management measures are put in place, 
like for instance Brazil’s IMF-approved taxes on stock 
market purchases (inflows), investors can quickly 
convert their positions into equities. Thus, Paragraph 
3 is a loophole that could be exploited to render 
the rest of the safeguard of little effectiveness.  
Moreover, measures directly targeting certain classes 
of bondholders, like those adopted by Iceland in 
2008, would not be legitimate (to reduce pressure on 
the króna and the flight of foreign currency, foreign 
investors in the so-called “glacier bonds” were 
prevented not only from divesting, but also from 
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• Restricts preventative measures
• Restricts regulations of capital flows
• necessity test restricts policy space
• May not give nations time to regulate
1.  Limits of Annex CCC.3  
“Temporary Safeguard Measures”
 The CCC.3 safeguard is very similar to 
the GATS safeguard for the balance of 
payments.  While a major step in the right direction, 
several legal scholars have raised the following 
concerns about this approach:
•   Restricts preventative measures.   
The proposed BOP safeguard would likely only 
allow regulating capital outflows, rather than both 
inflows and outflows.  In CCC.3 this is evident in 
2. (a) where restrictive measures to regulate the 
movement of capital could be applied “in the 
event of serious balance of payments and external 
financial difficulty or the threats thereof” and in 
2. (b) where such measures can only be used in 
“exceptional circumstances” that “cause or threaten 
to cause serious difficulties for macroeconomic 
management”.3  This conflicts with a growing 
consensus in the IMF and the economics field 
regarding the need to allow policy tools that can 
both prevent crises and the subsequent need to 
regulate outflows of capital.  
•   Restricts regulations of capital flows undertaken 
for other legitimate policy objectives.   
As recent research in economics and the IMF has 
shown, regulating the inflow of capital may be 
important to maintain financial stability—not only 
for macroeconomic management and potential 
balance-of-payments crises but also to stem asset 
bubbles and the build up of debt in an economy.4   
For such legitimate policy objectives, this “safeguard” 
would appear inapplicable. 
•   Necessity test restricts policy space.   
Under the Temporary Safeguard Measures in CCC.3, 
the initial burden of proof is on the respondent to 
show that capital controls are “necessary.” In other 
words, they are not “self-judging” and restrict the 
converting coupons matured into foreign currency 
and transfer them abroad).6
•   Further restricts time horizon for crisis 
prevention and mitigation.   
Paragraph 2(e) adds that measures “in no case shall 
exceed one year in duration.”  For reasons described 
above, this addition would be detrimental to the 
efforts of nation states and the IMF to mitigate 
a financial crisis.  Instability can last for months, 
but it can also last for years.  In terms of inflows, 
from 2009 to 2012 when interest rates were low in 
the United States and high in emerging markets, 
many emerging markets put in place regulations 
on capital inflows for that full period.  Indeed, the 
IMF voiced approval for regulations of that duration 
in South Korea and Brazil during that period. 
Moreover, during a crisis the regulation of outflows 
can also vary.7 The IMF has insisted that Iceland 
maintain its regulations on capital outflows through 
2015, despite being put in place under an IMF 
program in 2009.8  
•   Price-based regulations are not always 
sufficient.   
Paragraph 2(f ) in the alternative text requires 
that any regulation be “price-based.”  As the IMF 
has recently noted, price-based regulations are 
preferable but there are cases when nations will have 
to have quantitative limits on the inflow or outflow 
of capital.9  Indeed, Iceland’s regulations on the 
outflow of capital have been quantity-based under 
their IMF program.
•   Legitimate regulations to address instability 
could be deemed “confiscatory.”  
This clause should be read together with the 
expropriation provision, which does not contain any 
reference to preserve the right of a contracting party 
to impose or collect a tax by withholding or other 
means. 
It follows that the sovereign right to impose taxes 
and to adopt fiscal measures will be subject to the 
“non-confiscatory requirement”. In financial law and 
in previous tribunals even taxes have been deemed 
“confiscatory” if they are seen as unreasonable 
interference with the investor’s property rights.10   
For instance, the imposition of taxes can amount to 
a confiscatory measure if they single-out individual 
investors and far from normal tax practice 
(punitive). While a small tax or restriction may 
not be seen as confiscatory, it is also more likely 
not to meet its desired objective.  Brazil’s recent 
taxes on inflows were only partly effective because 
the tax rate was relatively small.  Larger taxes, or 
quantitative limits, could be deemed confiscatory.  
Indeed, there is some danger that Chile’s law 
(currently not in force) allowing unremunerated 
reserve requirements (the “encaje”) would be 
jeopardized under this clause.  The “encaje” program 
calls for a certain percentage of an investment to 
be stored in a non-interest bearing account for a 
period of 3 to 6 months in the central bank.  If there 
is major capital flight during that 3 to 6 months, 
the investment still needs to be held in the central 
bank.  An investor could claim that a portion of the 
investment was confiscated. The decision would be 
left to the ample discretion of an ISDS tribunal.  It is 
thus no surprise that, according to Annex II-E of the 
leaked TPP investment chapter, Chile has requested 
an exception for the encaje. This, however, does not 
protect other governments” authority to deploy 
similar policies. 
3.  Regulating Capital Flows in the TPP
It is paramount that 21st Century trade and 
investment treaties provide all parties to 
the agreement the flexibilities necessary 
to prevent and mitigate financial instability.  In 
proposing language based on GATS exceptions at 
the WTO, some TPP negotiators have taken a strong 
first step in the right direction.  However, rather than 
improving upon the limitations of the older GATS 
language, the “alternative” text appears to further 
weaken the ability of member states to regulate 
capital flows.  
As we argued in an earlier policy brief, a stronger 
safeguard would grant member states the proper 
policy space to prevent and mitigate financial 
instability, allow the regulation of both the inflow 
and outflow of capital, be self-judging with respect 
to the “necessity” of implementing such reform, and 
grant nations and the IMF ample time to regulate.  
Below is a proposed set of recommended changes 
to the CCC.3 clause based on earlier proposals 
we drafted for a policy brief for the G-24 finance 
ministers in 2013.11 This proposal, which is still based 
on the GATS safeguard and would be self-judging, 
would grant nations the flexibility they need to 
prevent and mitigate financial instability and honor 
their commitments to other international financial 
regimes.
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4. Recommendations for Strengthening Annex CCC.3 
Recommendations are embedded in the original text, using the color black for additions and 
the color red for deletions.
TPP Draft Article CCC.3: Temporary Safeguard Measures
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining restrictive 
measures with regard to transfers or payments for current account transactions in the event of serious balance of 
payments and [[or]] external financial difficulties or threats thereof. 
2. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining restrictive 
measures [[that it considers necessary]] with regard to [the movement of capital, or] payments or transfers 
relating to the movements of capital: 
   (a) in the event of serious balance of payments and [[or]] external financial difficulties or threats thereof; or 
   (b) where, in exceptional circumstances, [the movement of capital, or] payments or transfers relating to     
capital movements cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties for [[financial stability or]] macroeconomic 
management, in particular, the operation of monetary policy or exchange rate policy [[and policies relevant to 
the management of the financial system]]. 
3. Any measure adopted or maintained under paragraphs 1 or 2 shall:
   (a) be applied on a non-discriminatory basis such that no Party is treated less favorably than any other Party or 
non-Party
   (b) be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; 
   (c) avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic, and financial interests of any other Party;
   (d) not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances described in paragraphs 1 or 2; and
   (e) be temporary and be phased out progressively as the situation specified in paragraphs 1 or 2 improves 
[[permits]]. 
4. In the case of trade in goods, [in order to safeguard the external financial position and balance of payments 
of Parties,] Article XII of the GATT and the Understanding on the Balance of Payment Provisions of the GATT 
1994 are incorporated mutatis mutandis. 
[5. In the case of trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting trade restrictive measures in order to safeguard its external financial position and balance of payments. 
These restrictive trade measures shall be in accordance with the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).]
[In the case of trade in services, [in order to safeguard the external financial position and balance of payments 
of Parties,] paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Articles XII of the GATS are incorporated mutatis mutandis.]
6. A Party adopting or maintaining measures under [paragraphs 1, 2 or [4] [or 5] [paragraphs 1 or 2] shall: 
   (a) promptly notify the other Parties of the measures, including any changes therein; and 
   (b) promptly commence consultations with the other Parties in order to review the measures adopted or 
maintained by it. 
         (i) In the case of capital movements, respond to any other Party that requests consultations in relation 
to the measures adopted by it, provided that such consultations are not otherwise taking place outside of this 
Agreement. 
         (ii) In the case of current account transactions, if consultations in relation to the measures adopted by 
it are not taking place at the WTO, a Party, if requested, shall promptly commence consultations with any 
interested Party.
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Governments may also want to consider additional revisions in the areas of the prudential 
exception and dispute settlement. These may include a prudential exception clause drafted 
along these lines:
 
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining measures for 
prudential reasons with respect to financial services, such as/including: 
   (a) measures for the protection of depositors, financial market participants and investors, policy holders, policy 
claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial institution; 
   (b) measures for the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial responsibility of financial 
institutions; 
   (c) measures aimed at ensuring the integrity and stability of a Party’s financial system. 
2. (a) Nothing in this Agreement shall apply to non-discriminatory measures of general application taken by any 
public entity in pursuit of monetary and related credit policies or exchange rate policies. 
    (b) For the purposes of this paragraph, “public entity” means a central bank or monetary authority of a Party. 
           With regard to dispute settlement, governments may consider including only a state-state process 
(as in some existing trade agreements between TPP governments) as a protection against lawsuits 
brought by foreign investors who have little regard for the public interest. If investor-state dispute 
settlement is included, it would be advisable to require that investors first exhaust domestic legal remedies 
and to provide a diplomatic screen so that governments can work together to prevent claims that are 
inappropriate, without merit, or would cause serious public harm.  Coupled with stronger and clearer 
language such as that proposed above, dispute processes like these would do a better job of granting TPP 
parties the flexibility they need to prevent and mitigate financial instability.
TPP Article xxxxx: Prudential Measures
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 1. The authors would like to thank Michael Waibel, Rachel 
Thrasher, Deborah Siegel and Ben Beachy for useful 
comments on this memo. 
2. Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty: Advanced Investment 
Chapter working document for all 12 nations (January 20, 
2015 draft)Accessed at: https://wikileaks.org/tpp-investment/
WikiLeaks-TPP-Investment-Chapter.pdf
3.  IMF analysis of this language confirmed the limited ability 
to regulate inflows under these provisions.  See “130 A 
Pardee Center Task Force Report | March 2013. Hagan, Sean 
(2000). “Transfer of Funds.” UnCTAD Series on International 
Investment Agreements. new york and Geneva: United 
nations Conference on Trade and Development. Accessed at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd20.en.pdf. This is also well 
established in the academic literature, See Viterbo, Annamaria 
(2012). International Economic Law and Monetary Measures, 
Limitations to States” Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement, 
London: Edward Elgar.  For further analyses see Gallagher, 
Kevin P. and Leonardo Stanley (2012), Capital Account 
Regulations and the Trading System: A Compatibility Review, 
Boston University, Global Economic Governance Initiative.  
4.  See International Monetary Fund (2013). The Liberalization 
and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional View. 
Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/
so/2012/POL120312A.htm, also Gallagher, Kevin P. and Jose 
Antonio Ocampo (2012), Regulating Capital Flows for Long 
Run Development. Boston University, Global Economic 
Governance Initiative.
5. See Viterbo (2012) and Gallagher et al (2012) for in-depth 
treatment of GATS safeguard and necessity test.
6. See Viterbo (2011) “The Return of Capital Controls as 
Emergency Tools to Counter Financial Crises. Iceland’s Crisis 
and the Constraints Imposed by the EEA Agreement”, in 
Capital Markets Law Journal, 2011, vol. 6, n. 2, pp. 214-237
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